Abstract The Paris Agreement solidified the participation of subnational governments in global mitigation efforts, continuing the shift towards a polycentric landscape of climate action. Many scholars have suggested that the success of this emergent regime will depend, at least in part, on its ability to integrate climate action from non-state and subnational entities. Vertical alignment, the linking and coordination of policies between different levels of government, and horizontal alignment, the connection of peer cities and regions through networks of transnational climate governance, can help facilitate needed coherence. But, how do multiple actors link or interact at multiple scales and domains? In this article, we develop an analytical framework for examining different modes of vertical and horizontal alignment that subnational actors have employed to address climate change mitigation. We identify key elements in nine case studies of subnational climate action to examine the intersectionalities of alignment mechanisms that catalyze subnational climate actions. The paper concludes with a discussion about how vertical and horizontal alignment pathways overlap, intersect, and exhibit trade-offs.
Introduction
not analyze linkages between all actors in the multifaceted system, but we apply our analytical framework to cases of subnational climate actions as a "plausibility probe" (George and Bennett 2005) towards identifying ideal or representative types of alignment pathways. Cities, states, and regions are among the most active members of the transnational climate governance regime: the EU-based Covenant of Mayors currently boasts more than 7000 signatories, while C-40 Cities for Climate Leadership represents 90 of the world's largest cities, comprising 8% of the global population (see www.covenantofmayors.eu and www.c40.org). City networks for climate action have been some of the longest established groups in transnational climate governance (Betsill and Bulkeley 2004) , meaning their evolution can be traced.
Subnational governments also offer a multidimensional perspective on the polycentric climate system, as they engage with an array of actors and initiatives (i.e., horizontal interactions) while negotiating relationships with government offices at regional and national levels (i.e., vertical interactions). Most studies tend to have a one-dimensional focus.
2 Researchers have paid less attention to how vertical and horizontal linkages interact and overlap than to the fact that these linkages exist. These connections may work synergistically, yet they can also be disruptive (Harrison 2010; Biermann et al. 2009 )-though the literature suggests that these negative interactions are rare (Oberthür and Gehring 2006) . 3 Our analysis examines cases of subnational climate actions that illustrate various alignments, both vertical, across different levels of government, and horizontal, with external transnational climate governance (TCG) networks and initiatives. These studies can be used to determine alignment intersectionalities that can increase the prospects for coherence in the global climate governance system, primarily through mechanisms we define in an analytical framework introduced in this paper. This typology identifies vertical and horizontal linkages that catalyze convergence around knowledge sharing, rule setting, and capacity building to identify pathways for enacting climate policies to shed light on how multiple actors can promote coherence in the climate governance landscape. This paper first introduces an analytical framework that can be applied to understand various pathways subnational actors have used to initiate and implement climate mitigation actions. With nine case studies, we categorize these actors' linkages and pathways according to three primary functions: capacity building, rule setting, and information sharing. Our functional analysis and spatial mapping of these cases illustrate the initiation of subnational climate efforts, which can aid in identifying certain conditions and interactions that promote coherence in global climate governance between subnational climate actions and other actors.
Vertical and horizontal alignment of subnational climate actions
The interplay or linkage between subnational governments and other institutions, networks, and regimes produces what scholars refer to as interaction effects (Young 1996; Stokke 2001; Oberthür and Gehring 2006) . These effects can lead to convergence and, ultimately, coherence where subnational actors work together with other actors to achieve the goal of addressing global climate change. We consider alignment in both dimensions a way of coordinating actions to achieve climate mitigation. As long as actors linking multiple jurisdictions and diverse transnational networks (Betsill and Bulkeley 2004) share the common goal of climate mitigation (i.e., that climate actions are intentional), aligning efforts provides multiple benefits, including efficient resource allocation, information sharing, and transmission of best practices (Broekhoff et al. 2015; Andonova et al. 2009 ). At minimum, vertical alignment refers to the linking (Brown 2009 ) and coordination of policies between different levels of government (Berger and Steurer 2007) , with the aim of achieving policy coherence.
We define horizontal alignment as linkages between actors, as characterized in the TCG literature. TCG networks operate between and among nations to steer members towards public climate goals (Andonova et al. 2009 ). TCG networks take the form of membership clubs (e.g., C-40 Cities for Climate Leadership) and collaborative groups whose primary aim is to build capacity and share knowledge (e.g., ICLEI local leaders for sustainability). Horizontal linkages occur through transnational diffusion processes (Betsill and Bulkeley 2004; Hakelberg 2014; Tews and Busch 2002) whereby different kinds of actors become socialized or incentivized to adhere to the transnational rules of certain networks, creating local benefits in countries that may lack the vertical policy support to spur climate action (Bartley 2011) . Transnational relationships typically form between actors across borders when, according to Risse-Kappen (1995) , "at least one actor pursues her own agenda independent of national decisions." Transnational networks perform a range of governance functions, including norm coordination and diffusion, capacity building, rule implementation, and collective learning facilitation. These networks leverage resources across borders, pooling and distributing financial, managerial, and technical assets (Andonova et al. 2009 ).
As Roger et al. (2015) contend, various "opportunity structures," including political institutions and government policies, may dampen or boost subnational and non-state actors' participation in transnational climate governance. Some cases of transnational environmental policy (e.g., forestry certification schemes) offer compelling evidence that domestic policies and institutions can influence participation in multinational governance (Roger et al. 2015) . Andonova et al. (2009) describe the governance functions transnational regimes assume in "steering" subnational actors to take climate actions. Yet, how do these vertical and horizontal forces interact and create different-and sometimes competing-advantages and disadvantages for climate actors?
3 Characterizing subnational climate alignment: an analytical framework This section develops an analytical framework to identify and categorize the horizontal and vertical linkages in subnational climate policies, offering an ideal type of structure that could be extended to other actors. We expand on Andonova et al.'s (2009) three functional categories that networks use to steer members and posit that higher levels of government can enact similar influences. These functions are information sharing, capacity building, and rule setting, derived from the resources TCGs provide across borders, including diffusion of information and norms (e.g., C-40 Cities for Climate Leadership, which includes knowledge sharing as an explicit goal in its mission statement), resource allocation and distribution (e.g., R-20 Regions of Climate Change, which works with local partners to implement specific economic and climate-related projects), and negotiating and establishing norms, rules, and standards that typically fall outside the purview of intergovernmental negotiations (e.g., the Global Community Protocol for GHG accounting). Andonova et al. (2009) apply these functional categories to TCG networks, while other studies on vertical alignment and integration identify national governments playing similar roles (Rabe 2008; Jordan et al. 2012; Steinberg and Vandeveer 2012) . Building on these categories, we identify the vertical and horizontal forces supporting each function. & Information sharing: Information sharing is often the main resource channeled through TCGs steering constituents towards network goals. This process assumes a governance function when the knowledge shared is recognized as authoritative and directs network constituents (Andonova et al. 2009 ). National governments are also primary vehicles of information that initiate policies and actions at lower jurisdictional levels.
& Capacity building: Technical capacity and financial resources are frequently cited as key hurdles to implementing local climate action (Aylett 2015; Ryan 2014; C40 2016; Salon et al. 2014) . In the absence of strong vertical linkages, TCGs can provide resources (e.g., finance, expertise, labor, technology, and monitoring) to enable action. The primary indicator we use to gauge capacity building and implementation is funding, determining whether financing is primarily provided by national governments or through participation in TCG networks.
& Regulative/rule setting: In traditional governance systems, rule setting and compliance enforcement reside in a hierarchical, sovereign power (Andonova et al. 2009 ). TCGs can contribute to climate change governance by validating a set of norms and establishing rules to guide and constrain constituents. To evaluate rule setting and regulative linkages, we focus on participation in monitoring, reporting, and verification systems through national governments and TCGs.
We applied this framework to nine cases of subnational climate action first detailed in Hsu et al. (2015) , selected to demonstrate a range of climate mitigation strategies that exceed national policies or were created outside of national mandates. Identifying vertical and horizontal linkages in these functional categories allows an examination of how external networks and nested government structures interact to produce and implement subnational climate action. The cases represent a resonance group-"categories of social problems and processes that share many characteristics in common across borders" (Steinberg 2015 )-with policies and programs "surrounded by actor networks whose members routinely exchange information and ideas across borders." These exchanges produce policy convergence and a "willful connection through actor networks" (Steinberg 2015) in "the absence of a formal coercive authority" (Gordon 2016; Jordan et al. 2015) .
We selected cases in high-emitting countries, six of which-Brazil, Canada, China, Germany, India, and the USA-are among the world's ten largest emitters. These countries comprise roughly a quarter of all non-state and subnational climate actions on NAZCA, and the sectors represented account for around 60% (authors' calculations). Our selections were also informed by interviews with in-country experts familiar with the projects and national policy contexts. Our paper's aim is to be illustrative, not necessarily comprehensive, and demonstrate our framework's analytic utility, as it provides a two-dimensional assessment of alignment pathways and interactive effects.
Using primary research (Interviews 1-8, 2016) (i.e., interviews with TCG or subnational government participants and evaluation of first-hand project or national policy documents) and secondary literature review, Table S1 (Supplementary Information) details vertical and horizontal components corresponding with the functional categories outlined above. To limit time frames of inquiry, we assessed each action's initiation and implementation phases for evidence where vertical or horizontal factors contributed. This information informs a spatial mapping (Fig. 1 ) of the cases according to functions present or absent in alignment. For instance, where we found vertical linkages in all three categories, we determined the case to be maximally aligned in a particular dimension. The absence of linkages would position case studies at the opposite end of the axis. This spatial mapping allows for direct comparison of alignment pathways in each case as well as the creation of three typologies: synergistic climate action, in the top right-hand quadrant, where both vertical and horizontal alignments played a role in implementation; autonomous climate action, where neither vertical nor horizontal alignment is present; and one-dimensional climate action, where alignment only occurs in one direction (horizontally or vertically driven action). The typologies presented here are meant to be descriptive rather than normative (i.e., we do not assume that one mode of alignment is more effective than the other). Figure 1 is not meant to assess the relative strengths of the vertical and horizontal alignments in the three criteria nor the effectiveness of these linkages.
4 Range of alignment pathways: synergistic, autonomous, and one-dimensional alignments Identifying components of horizontal and vertical linkages leads to the creation of a typology to examine alignment pathways, the trade-offs (e.g., compromises) and synergies between Hsu et al. 2015) . See Table S1 (Supplementary Information) for the analysis of components that inform this figure these linkages, and interactive effects that, in our cases, have primarily produced positive, rather than disruptive, effects. We find few cases that are aligned in solely one direction. Five of the nine cases fall within the synergistic quadrant, while two cases, California and British Columbia, demonstrated no significant vertical or horizontal linkages. Rajasthan demonstrated no formal horizontal linkages (although informal ones likely exist), while Hamburg included no vertical linkages. Shenzhen and Acre show elements of vertical alignment in all three categories. Here, we synthesize the main pathways observed in our nine case studies and describe how the subnational cases assume these typologies.
Synergistic alignment
Synergistic cases exhibit the productive interaction between horizontal and vertical linkages. We find evidence of bi-directional linkages generating subnational climate policies in Acre, Belo Horizonte, Cape Town, Oran, and Shenzhen. In these cases, horizontal and vertical linkages interact in predominantly complementary ways, filling needs or gaps within or across each policy's information sharing, regulative, and capacity building functions. We apply Oberthür and Gehring's (2006) definition of synergy as occurring when the "'policy direction' of one initiative (e.g., the subnational governments we consider) is supported by the measures taken by another institution (e.g., a national government or TCG)." The predominance of cases in the synergistic quadrant suggests that subnational governments are aligned bi-directionally in various pathways. While our analysis focuses primarily on the policy initiation and implementation phases, our interviews with program managers, government representatives, and other stakeholders engaged in these case studies revealed that these synergistic alignment pathways change over time, given shifting political climates, priorities, and the presence or absence of climate champions.
Horizontal linkages can build on or translate national mandates to local contexts, providing capacity building or know-how to initiate subnational policies. Acre's deforestation policies, for instance, build on its voluntary adoption of Brazil's national 80% deforestation goal, yet it developed its own policies linking local communities to international carbon markets to incentivize avoided deforestation. To get this system running, Acre's connections with a broad network of climate and forestry-focused organizations brought in funding and strengthened capacity to develop and implement the first Jurisdictional and Nested REDD+ (JNR) Program (VCS 2015). Oran's integrated solid waste management program is similar in that external networks facilitated the local adoption of a waste sorting and recycling program initiated at the national level (Algeria's National Program of Municipal Waste Management (PROGDEM)). Oran worked with external TCG network R-20 Regions for Climate Change (R-20) to tailor the program to create material streams that will attract private sector funding and monetize recycling efforts (Interview 8 2016) .
Vertical alignment in synergistic cases provides top-down policy support and financing, often while allowing subnational governments latitude to experiment with policy initiatives and draw on horizontal linkages. The cities of Belo Horizonte and Shenzhen have both piloted climate actions absent at the national level, allowing for experimentation at local levels before programs are expanded nationwide. These cases describe instances of what Oberthür and Gehring term an "interaction through commitment" (2006) . Shenzhen, for example, initiated its municipal Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) directly through a top-down policy mandate, as a way to facilitate China's national energy and climate targets. The city was given leeway to determine the scope of actors included in the ETS and its own measurement, reporting, and verification protocols. This flexibility is one factor contributing to Shenzhen's ability to overachieve the national carbon intensity reduction target of 17%, reaching instead a 25% goal (China Emissions Exchange 2014). Belo Horizonte initially benefited from close national linkages, although it launched its integrated solid waste management program primarily on its own. The city was able to attract national public funding, in part because Brazil's national government believed Belo Horizonte's waste management strategies could provide a template for local authorities throughout the country (Centre for Public Impact 2016). The city's strategies informed subsequent national waste management policies at the national level.
In other synergistic examples, horizontal alignment appears as a formative force in producing synergistic subnational climate action. From 1999 to 2010, the City of Cape Town partnered with the Dutch NGO SouthSouthNorth (SSN) and residents of the Kuyasa neighborhood to initiate the Kuyasa Project, an effort to retrofit and increase the energy efficiency of 2309 low-income homes. NGOs, along with South Africa's National Department of Environmental Affairs, viewed the project as a test case for a broader strategy of leveraging the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and international carbon credit market to fund similar efforts (Interviews 6 2016; Interview 7 2016). While bringing solar water heaters to other cities in South Africa, national support has not, however, benefited Cape Town itself (Interview 6 2016), reflecting the national government's need to prioritize funding. Actors usually seek to align vertically to garner financing from the federal government, but if unsuccessful, or if federal funds are insufficient, they can seek external support through TCGs or other mechanisms.
Autonomous alignment
Independent climate policies can enable subnational governments to act with great speed and ambition and to frame key policy discussions. California and British Columbia (BC) are cases of autonomous climate actions, initiated primarily by these regional governments without significant vertical or horizontal linkages. BC pioneered Canada's first carbon tax on fossil fuels-a policy with no counterpart at the national level. Even among the world's existing carbon taxes, BC's policy is unique in its ambition. Being the most comprehensive and ambitious in North America, the carbon tax addresses nearly all emissions from fossil fuels, which account for an estimated 70% of the province's greenhouse gas emissions (Ministry of Finance 2013). For nearly a decade, California has pioneered state-level climate actions that exceed national policies, mostly through its Global Warming Solutions Act (AB-32), which, in 2002, established a comprehensive program to reduce the state's greenhouse emissions. At their inception, these actions showed little connection to horizontal TCGs or vertical policy instruments.
A lack of federal leadership may have driven leaders in both regions to act, and their strategies reflect the advantages of autonomous approaches to climate action. As Happaerts (2013) summarizes, a lack of initial alignment can enable subnational governments to experiment with innovative solutions (Jörgensen 2007; Meadowcroft 2008; Hoffmann 2011) , tailor policies to local conditions (Toner and Meadowcroft 2009) , and take action despite federal inertia (Jörgensen 2007; Meadowcroft 2008 ). California's policy leadership generated political capital that enhanced its ability to negotiate with national and international heads of state, and established it as a site for policy development and policy entrepreneurs (Rabe 2008) . Initiating independent policies also enables subnational governments to craft strategies that mitigate emissions while maximizing economic opportunities (Rabe 2008 ). California's vehicle emissions and fuel standards, for instance, are product standards that affect in-state and out-ofstate producers equally, as opposed to emissions standards, which only apply to in-state sources (Harrison 2012) .
Both the BC and California cases indicate that while an autonomous alignment pathway can be advantageous at the outset, forging stronger linkages can be beneficial to maintaining local efforts. Vertical and horizontal alignments have formed and strengthened around California's policies over time (Interview 4 2016) . Fifteen states have adopted California's vehicle standards for criteria pollutants, and nine states have adopted its zero vehicle emissions standards. An array of subnational partnerships supports the rollout and expansion of zeroemitting and plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, a key element of the state's 2012 Advanced Clean Cars Program. These targets' broad adoption reinforces California's goals by increasing the market and policy support for low-or zero-emitting vehicles and builds the state's influence with auto-manufacturers and the national government (Interview 4 2016) .
Similarly, BC initiated and orchestrated its carbon tax independently, yet the province has joined networks of governments implementing similar policies, supporting the diffusion of carbon pricing policies in Canada and abroad. BC's success may have helped spark the adoption of carbon pricing policies in Alberta, Manitoba, and Ontario. Extending carbon pricing policies to other regions reduces the risk of emissions leakage, softens competitiveness impacts, and can lower abatement costs by extending emissions trading to a larger market (Harrison 2012) . Shifts that bring alignment to autonomous climate actions are not always seamless, as efforts to reconcile formerly unaligned national and subnational priorities often encounter difficulties (Happaerts 2013) . Subnational jurisdictions that chose an autonomous pathway with ambitions of broader adoption of their policies will have to navigate the tradeoffs of what Biermann et al. (2009) deem a "narrow-but-deep" approach-substantial policy goals with relatively little participation-and a "broad-but-shallow" approach-expanded participation and a less demanding regime.
One-directional alignment
One-directional modes of alignment, those that are either predominantly horizontally or vertically aligned, enable subnational governments to hone in on the elements of alignment that increase their power and legitimacy. In Hamburg, voluntary, flexible policies may be most effective for recruiting corporate participation in the city's resource efficiency measures. For Rajasthan, framing its solar policies within India's high-profile solar target could help draw interest and investment to its solar ambitions. The degree of alignment varies across policies, suggesting that the choice between loosely and closely aligned relationships depends on a subnational government's goals. While Hamburg initiated its policy primarily independently, with TCG networks supporting its reporting and rule setting, Rajasthan's solar energy policies are closely aligned with India's national approach.
Hamburg's program, like many of the climate initiatives in the synergistic quadrant, frames its activities around a national mitigation goal, but unlike these examples, it does not draw from or respond to a specific policy initiative or mandate and, as a result, is not classified as vertically aligned. The city's Climate Action Plan aims to cut emissions at 30% below the 1990 levels by 2020 and 80% below the 1990 levels by 2050, in direct support of Germany's national target. As part of this framework, the city's Senate and business community have coordinated on a range of voluntary resource efficiency measures that go beyond legal requirements, delivering cost and carbon savings (City of Hamburg 2013). The city's membership in several TCG networks supports the rule setting aspects of the program, making the city's horizontal linkage its strongest. With only one area of connection, however, the initiative remains largely independent. This relatively low level of horizontal alignment helps raise the profile of participating businesses, while ensuring flexibility in implementing the policy.
Rajasthan's alignment is primarily vertical, and these linkages play a larger role in shaping the state's climate policy than do Hamburg's. As a state leader in India's solar energy deployment, Rajasthan owes part of its success to its geography-it has the highest levels of solar radiation in India and contains large tracts of land well suited to hosting solar utilities (The Times of India 2015). The state has framed its policies in response to national legislation and goals; it began its bid to exceed national solar power capacity targets in 2010, shortly after the national government launched its flagship policy for renewable energy, the Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission. Before Prime Minister Modi expanded national goals in June 2015, aiming to increase India's solar energy capacity to 100 gigawatts (GW) by 2022, Rajasthan's 2011 solar power capacity goal of 25 GW exceeded the national goal of 22 GW (Chadha 2014) . This ambitious commitment and the state's Solar Energy Policy for 2014, which removes key obstacles in financing and land acquisition (Chadha 2014) , demonstrate the subnational governments' agility in implementation. By closely hewing to and enabling the local adoption of national solar energy goals, Rajasthan reinforces a national policy that benefits its interests, while also distinguishing itself from other competing sites for solar energy.
Discussion
Illustrating various subnational climate actors' policy alignments captures the ways vertical and horizontal connections act as conduits to initiate and support subnational climate action. There is no "one-size-fits-all" formula for actors to achieve coherence-our case studies demonstrate that many different alignment pathways can aid or spark the convergence around common goals and approaches to climate action. Our analysis reveals overlaps among alignment structures and describes the trade-offs inherent to certain pathways, informing an understanding of the interaction effects between multiple levels of governance, including international regimes (e.g., UNFCCC), TCGs, and different scales of government. Progress realizing environmental policy integration in much of the world-for instance in the European Union (Watson et al. 2004 )-has been slow and contested, underscoring the need for concrete examples of where actors have navigated uncharted terrain and joined with networks, regimes, and institutions to implement climate policies.
Across the synergistic cases, subnational actors utilize both vertical and horizontal linkages to perform a range of functions, often strategically using one form of alignment to supplement gaps in the other. When these case studies demonstrate less vertical alignment, there is often greater horizontal alignment in the form of TCGs and network participation. In Cape Town, for instance, international TCGs helped drive the project's implementation in the absence of a strong national government mandate. Less vertical integration (i.e., a higher degree of administrative decentralization) allows non-state and subnational actors a greater agency to engage in external, transnational advocacy networks (Roger et al. 2015) . The lack of a "central steering point," as in the case of the EU, has meant leadership has come from multiple points to avoid "policy gridlock" (Jordan et al. 2012 ). This decentralization, however, makes it more challenging for subnational governments to access the financial resources and institutional capacity needed to implement climate action.
Leveraging TCGs and horizontal linkages can lower the costs associated with designing and implementing climate policies. Larson (2002) describes the assignment of new policy responsibilities to local governments without the corresponding funding for implementation as a common global trend (Ryan 2014) . By helping subnational governments acquire technical capacity and financial resources, horizontally aligned networks address common obstacles. A 2016 C-40 report identified 2300 high-impact, readily deliverable urban climate activities but noted that three quarters of these projects would require support from national governments or the private sector to overcome gaps in resources and funding, mobilize political will and leadership, and navigate institutional, regulatory, or legislative issues that lie outside of cities' jurisdiction (C40 2016).
Subnational governments often choose to participate in TCG, absent national policy mandate or vertical directive, as a way of facilitating future compliance (Roger et al. 2015) or gaining credit (i.e., baseline protection) for acting as an early adopter to future regulation. None of the subnational climate actions we analyzed occurs in countries with national policies deemed "sufficient" by the Climate Action Tracker (http://climateactiontracker.org), which may explain why we observe more instances of horizontal than vertical alignment in our cases. National governments may intentionally keep weak vertical links to subnational climate efforts to lower enforcement costs and ensure friendlier relationships with lower administrative levels (Roger et al. 2015) . In Oran, for instance, Algeria's government has established a national waste management program but allows Oran to take the lead in working with TCGs to pilot new models of implementation.
The cases presented in this paper show that horizontal and vertical linkages most often generate virtuous cycles and positive feedback loops (Hoffmann 2011) , reaffirming other studies (Oberthür and Gehring 2006; Biermann et al. 2009 ) that observe primarily synergistic rather than disruptive interactions between regimes. Our finding resonates with much of the literature on transnational climate governance, which underscores the fact that TCGs usually occur in hybrid forms with national or state authorities (Andonova et al. 2009; Hale 2016) . In some cases, national alignment helps facilitate horizontal alignment and vice versa. In Belo Horizonte, national involvement in the city's waste management strategy helped to spread and scale effective waste management strategies to other cities in Brazil. In other instances, such as in Cape Town, subnational governments leverage elements of alignment to fill gaps in a program's capacity building, rule setting, and information sharing activities. These examples show that strengthening alignment in both dimensions can enhance overall coherence and coordination towards "mutual and reinforcing goals" (Keohane and Victor 2011) .
There may be cases in which closer alignment or interaction backfires. As Stokke (2001) notes, the central tension in polycentric governance regimes is the pull and push at the core of interactions between regimes-some reinforce and support activities upheld by another regime, while others display counteracting effects or duplication. In Acre's case, moves to vertically align with Brazil's national climate policies threaten the state's multiple agreements to link its forestry credits with carbon markets in California, Rio de Janeiro, and Sao Paulo. As Brazil defines its INDC, it may seek to subsume Acre's efforts, which could negate Acre's claim to additional credits and revenues (Climate Focus, Governors' Task Force on Climate & Forests 2013). In some instances, when subnational policies are scaled up, positive feedback loops remain incomplete. In Cape Town, for instance, the national government has adopted the city's goal of installing solar water heaters, but the high-level engagement has not directly supported or reinforced the city's efforts to meet local needs.
Conclusion
Subnational and regional climate actions are poised to play a critical role in meeting the Paris Agreement's mitigation goals. Fostering horizontal and vertical alignment for subnational climate actions could produce coherence in a fractured climate governance landscape. Recent studies note missed opportunities to realize greater mitigation through strong vertical and horizontal alignment, not least to meet the UNFCCC's imperative to raise the ambition of national climate actions in upcoming review cycles for the Paris Agreement. Our framework provides tools to identify alignment pathways taken by subnational actors and identify trade-offs and advantages inherent to each of these modes. It is essential to understand these pathways' nuances to coordinate the efficient use of resources and facilitate a rapid scaling up of climate action.
